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Kleppinger: Determination of Federal Water Rights Pursuant to the McCarran Am

DETERMINATION OF FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS
PURSUANT TO THE McCARRAN AMENDMENT:
GENERAL ADJUDICATIONS IN WYOMING
Increasing populations in the western United States
have expanded demand for water, already a scarce resource
in the region, to the point that potential demand far exceeds
present ability to increase sources of supply.' A product of
the expansion in water demand has been the development
of conflicting claims between federal and state authorities
to the ownership, control and administration of western
waters.2
It has been estimated that federal lands in the western
United States provide over sixty percent of the total water
runoff in the region.3 The majority of the federal runoff
originates on land presently administered by the Forest Service and the National Park Service.4 Federal claims to ownership of millions of acres of land in the West 5 provide the
Copyright@ 1977 by the University of Wyoming
1.

SENATE SELECT COMM. ON NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES,

NATIONAL WATER

RESOURCES, S. REP. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1961).
2. Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States,
- U.S. __, 96 S. Ct.
1236 (1976). See generally, Note, Federal Water Rights Legislation and
the Reserved Rights Controversy, 53 GEO. L.J. 750 (1965); SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES ACTIVITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Comm. Print No. 32, Water
Supply and Demand, 1960).
3. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND:
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND
LAW RmEVW COMMISSION, at 141 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ONE THIRD

OF THE NATION'S LAND].
The Commission quantified the importance of waters originating are
federal lands to western development:
The importance of the water yield from public lands to the economy,
present and future, of the 11 western states is clear: Approximately $12.5 billion has been invested by public and private sources
in water storage facilities, and additional billions have been invested to irrigate 23 million acres of land dependent in major part
on public land water yields; about 96 percent of the region's 32
million people and most of its mapor cities and metropolitan areas
are dependent in some degree on public land water; and the virtually entire hydroelectric capacity of 23.6 million kilowatts (as
of 1968) is dependent upon water which originates on public
lands.
Id. See also Kiechel and Burke, Federal-StateRelations in Water Resources
Adjudication and Administration; Integration of Reserved Rights with
Appropriative Rights, 18 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 531, 550 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Keichel and Burke].
4. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, supra note 3, at 141; Kiechel and Burke,
supra note 3, at 550.
5. See Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State
Conflicts Over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 43 (1968).
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United States with a sound basis for asserting paramount
rights to water in many western states.8
The potential impact of these federal water claims on
western development is substantial. The availability of water
is often a determinative factor in the economic productivity
of land in the semiarid West. To a substantial degree the
western states have come to depend upon water originating
on federal lands. As a result, many state officials openly
fear that federal claims on large quantities of water could
retard development in the western United States.'
At the center of the federal-state controversy in the area
of water rights is the reservation docrine, and the difficulties
encountered by state water authorities in coordinating federal water claims based on the doctrine with state water law,
administration and planning. The controversy has been compounded by uncertainties surrounding the ability of a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit against the United States for the purpose of adjudicating conflicting water claims.
In 1952 the Congress, attempting to remove much of this
uncertainty, passed a general waiver of sovereign immunity
in the area of water rights litigation providing that:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of
rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights,
where it appears that the United States is the owner
of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a
necessary party to such suit.8
6.

SENATE SELECT COMM. ON NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES, NATIONAL WATER
RESOURCES, supra,note 1. at 65.

7. Id. See generally
FUTURE:

NATIONAL

WATER

COMM'N, WATER

POLICIES FOR

THE

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE

at 459 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE]; TRELEASE, FEDERALSTATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW (Report No. NWC-L-71-014, National
Water Comm'n, Legal Study No. 5) (1971) [hereinafter cited as TRELEASE].
8. This statute, hereinafter cited as the McCarran Amendment, was enacted
in 1952 as a rider to the appropriations act for the Justice Department.
Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1953, §§ 208(a)-(c), 66 Stat.
560 (1952), 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
UNITED STATES BY THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION,
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The McCarran Amendment provides an exclusive method
whereby the United States may be joined in a state adjudication of water rights, thus allowing quantification of the extent of the federal claims, including those asserted under the
reserved rights doctrine, and coordination of such claims
with state-created water rights.
When Congress enacted the McCarran Amendment it
removed one of the major obstacles to the determination of
federal water rights. However, after a series of court decisions in which the scope of the statute was litigated, a number of serious questions remained unanswered. Further complicating the interpretation of the Amendment, was the legislative history of the McCarran Amendment which is, at best,
inconclusive in defining the type of procedure in which the
statute waives immunity.
During its 1977 session the Wyoming Legislature enacted a bill designed to permit a general judicial adjudication of
all water claims within the State.' The enactment was in
response to substantial questions regarding the issue of whether the Wyoming procedure of administrative adjudication
of water rights was within the parameters of the McCarran
Amendment. The primary purpose of the new Wyoming
adjudication statute is to provide a method for quantifying
federal reserved water rights in the State and coordinating
those rights with water rights derived under state law.'"
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the new
Wyoming judicial adjudication statute and its impact with
regard to federal water rights in the State. After analyzing
the nature and impact of the reserved rights doctrine, as well
as the use of the McCarran Amendment in water rights litigation, this comment will examine the newly enacted Wyoming judicial adjudication procedure, focusing primarily on
the availability of the McCarran Amendment in the adjudication of federally reserved rights in Wyoming.
9. Enrolled Act No. 2, 44th State Legislature (1977). The purpose of the bill
is to allow litigation to quantify federal rights in Wyoming which may
be brought in state courts pursuant to the McCarran Amendment. Casper
Star-Tribune, January 25, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
10. Id.
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THE RESERVED RIGHTS DOCTRINE

The reserved rights doctrine operates to create in the
federal government water rights which are independent of
and paramount to private water rights derived through state
law. Briefly stated, the doctrine holds that where the United
States reserves by treaty, act of Congress, or executive order
part of the public domain for a purpose which will potentially
require water, then a sufficient amount of water will be
deemed reserved from appropriation under the state law to
fulfill that purpose. 1 '
The doctrine has developed through a series of decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. In United States v. Rio
Grande Dam and Irrigation Co. 2 the Court hinted at the
existence of the doctrine. In dicta the Court indicated that
the states are prevented from legislating so as to destroy
or disrupt the right of the United States, "as the owner of
lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its
waters; so for at least as may be necessary for the beneficial
uses of the government property."13
The Supreme Court firmly recognized the doctrine of
reserved rights nine years later in Winters v. United States. 4
In Winters the Court squarely held that when Congress
created an Indian reservation an implied right to an unspecified quantity of water for the Indian's use was also created.'
The decision further held that the implied reserved right was
superior to the rights of subsequent appropriators claiming
rights arising under state law, even though the Indians had
failed to make a diversion for beneficial use.
In 1955, the reserved rights doctrine was extended to
non-Indian withdrawals of the public domain. The Court
held in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 7 that the
Desert Land Act of 1877,18 which previously had been thought
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 109.
174 U.S. 690 (1899).
Id. at 703.
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 576.
349 U.S. 435 (1955).
43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
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to sever waters from the western federal lands and subject
all non-navigable western waters to the laws of the states,
was inapplicable to reserved lands and lands open for sale
and disposition to the public."0 Prior to the decision many
authorities had presumed that the reserved rights doctrine
under the Winters decision was limited to Indian reserved
lands. However, the Federal Power Commission v. Oregon
decision clearly extended the doctrine to all federally reserved lands and to those other lands which are open for sale and
disposition to the public.
The reserved rights doctrine was again before the Court
in Arizona v. California." The Court delineated the parameters of the doctrine, holding that regardless of the method
used to create the reservation of federal lands the reservation
doctrine will apply and each reservation of land from the
public domain will be accompanied by an implied right to
an unspecified quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation."'
The doctrine thus has the effect of creating in the federal government claims to ownership and control of large
quantities of western waters. Although a party acquiring
a water right under state law prior to the reservation or
withdrawal has a vested right superior to the federal right,
a party acquiring a right under state law subsequent to the
reservation is junior to the federal right.2"
The impact of the reserved right doctrine is potentially
severe in the Western states. Dating from the expansion of
the doctrine in FederalPower Commission v. Oregon a number of federal agencies began to rely on reserved rights as
a source of water claims in addition to acquisition under
state law.2 8 The decision in Arizona v. Californialed a substantial number of federal agencies to adopt a policy of noncompliance with state law in the acquisition of water rights
19. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, supra note 17, at 446-48.
20. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
21. Id. at 595-601. See Note, Limiting Federal Reserved Water Rights Through
State Courts, 1972 UTAH L. Rsv. 48, 50-51 (1972).
22. Ranks, eupra note 5, at 48.
23. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, 8upra note 3, at 142.
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for use on reserved lands. Reliance was placed instead, on
federal claims through the reserved rights doctrine.2"
Many of the problems created by the reserved rights
doctrine are those encountered in coordinating potentially
vast but unqualified federal claims with state planning and
administration. Federal policies abrogating compliance with
state water laws and claiming paramount federal rights
under the authority of the reserved rights doctrine have
tended to impair planning and development at the state
level. Development, dependent upon the availability of water,
has been disrupted because neither present nor future water
availability can be assured in light of the unquantified federal claims."
THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT

Absent an express waiver of sovereign immunity in the
area of water rights determination, the states were precluded
from realizing a complete determination of the extent of
claims on state water sources.- State adjudication and determination procedures were able to fully delineate claims
These agencies include the Forest Service and the military departments.
ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, supra note 3, at 142.
25. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 7, at 460; Kiechel and Burke,
supra note 3, at 536.
The uncertainty generated by the reserved rights doctrine was summarized by the Colorado Supreme Court:
Our situation with respect to water rights has been that priorities
are decreed under state laws, but any water rights of the United
States in Colorado remain mysterious, largely unknown, uncatalogued and unrelated to decreed water rights. This creates an
We have a situundesirable, impractical and chaotic situation ....
ation in which the federal sovereign claims water rights which
are nowhere formally listed. Which are not the subject of any
decree or permit and which, therefore, are etheric in large part
to the person who has reason to know and evaluate the extent of
his priorities to the use of water. To have these federal rights in
a state of uncorrelated mystery is frustrating and completely
United States v. Dist. Court in
contrary to orderly procedure ....
and for the County of Eagle, 169 Colo. 555, 458 P.2d 760, 765 and
772 (1969).
The severe repercussions generated by the uncertainty surrounding
federal reserved rights and the impairment of state planning and coordination are realized upon consideration of the extent to which the western
United States is dependent upon waters originating upon or flowing
through federal lands. See discussion, supra note 3.
26. The doctrine of sovereign immunity in the context of water rights is exhaustively discussed in Comment, Adjudication of Water Rights Claimed
By the United States Application of Comvon-Law Remedies and the MeCarranAmendment of 1952, 48 CAL. L. REv. 94, 94-100 (1960).
24.
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arising under state law, but the extent of federal claims
through the reserved rights doctrine remained unquantified.
The McCarran Amendment was enacted as a legislative
waiver of sovereign immunity, granting to the states the
power to join the United States in any general litigation involving all water rights on a stream." The purpose underlying the immunity waiver was to insure participation of the
United States in state adjudication proceedings."8
For a time after the passage of the McCarran Amendment the United States participated in all forms of state
adjudication proceedings with minimal resistance. However,
emergence of federal non-Indian reserved rights in Federal
Power Commission v. Oregon29 generated intense resistance
to the concept of reserved rights in the western states. Federal agencies, apprehensive of provincial attitudes developing in state courts, sought to keep adjudication of federal
reserved rights out of the reach of state judges and water
officials."
27. Department of Justice Appropriation Act, 1953, §§ 208(a)-(c), 66 Stat.
560 (1952), 43 U.S.C. §§ 666 (1970). The statute is reproduced in text
accompanying note 8 supra.
Congress had previously promulgated immunity waivers which either
did not specifically refer to proceedings involving water rights or
which were applicable only to particular federal projects. The Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970), and the Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80
(1970), are general waivers of immunity to certain suits which may be
applied in the area of water law. For an immunity waiver relating particularly to water law, see section 14 of the Colorado River Storage Project
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620m (1970), allowing the joinder of the United States
in suits for enforcement of that act in the United States Supreme Court.
28. Town of Durham v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 436 (D.N.H. 1958);
TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 202.
The legislative history of the statute indicates that the waiver was
designed to allow participation of the United States in state adjudications.
This purpose is implicit in a letter written by Senator McCarran, sponsor
of the Amendment, to Senator Magnuson regarding the latter's concern
that suits within the scope of the amendment might be brought in an effort
to block or delay certain federal developments such as the Hell's Canyon
project:
S.18 is not intended to be used for the purpose of obstructing the
project of which you speak or any similar project and it is not
intended to be used for any other purpose than to allow the United
States to be joined in a suit wherein it is necessary to adjudicate
all of the rights of various owners on a given stream. This is so
because unless all of the parties owning or in the process of acquiring water rights on a particular stream can be joined as parties
defendant, any subsequent decree would be of little value. S. Ra.
No. 755. 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1951).
29. Supra note 17.
30. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 203. See text accompanying note 24, supra.
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The position taken by the United States in Green River
Adjudication v. United States3 ' is illustrative of this federal
apprehension. Joined in an adjudication pursuant to the
McCarran Amendment, the United States filed claims to 715
different water rights, principally deriving the claims from
the reservation of national forest lands. Additionally, the
federal government attempted to obtain a ruling that the
decree of the state court would not preempt other water
claims when eventually needed for the reservation, which
uses would be superior to all nonfederal rights with priorities later than the reservation date. The argument was rejected by the Utah court, holding that the federal government
could assert only those rights decreed and would be bound
by the decree to the same extent as any other party."2
The reluctance of the federal government to be joined
in state adjudication proceedings has escalated the federal
state controversy regarding the control and use of waters
originating on federally reserved lands. Delineation of the
scope of proceedings to which the McCarran Amendment
waives immunity has become an important arena for the
federal-state controversy. A number of troublesome questions regarding the extent of the statute's immunity waiver
remain. These questions revolve around the two types of
proceedings addressed in the McCarran Amendment: suits
for the adjudication of water rights, and suits for the administration of rights.
Suits for the Adjudication of Water Rights
The McCarran Amendment waives sovereign immunity
and gives consent to the joinder of the United States in any
suit "for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a
river system or any other source. . . ."I' The phrase "adjudication of rights to the use of water" has developed through
the statutes and case law of the western states to have a rath31. 17 Utah 2d 50, 404 P.2d 251 (1965).
32. Id. at 252. See also Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Cons. Dist., 130 Colo.
375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954) where the federal government, apprehensive of
state court attitudes toward reserved rights, withdrew from a Colorado
adjudication.

33. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1) (1970).
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er restricted and technical meaning. The general nature of
such an adjudication is the process wherein water rights are
established as against all other users on a particular water
source. "4 When the Congress included the suit for adjudication language in the McCarran Amendment it is clear that
it was to this type of proceeding which the waiver of immunity was directed. 5 Essentially, a general adjudication
procedure is established as part of a state water code, the
purpose of which is to determine priorities of all users on a
stream. The action is typically brought by a state administrative officer or a private water user."
1. Adjudication of Water Rights: Judicial Proceedings.
It is clear from the express wording of subsection (a)
(1) of the McCarran Amendment that the statute applies to
judicial, as distinguished from administrative, proceedings
properly denominated as general adjudications or general determination actions. The federal courts have uniformly held
that the phrase "suits for adjudication" in the McCarran
Amendment contemplates judicial proceedings wherein the
plaintiffs seek to settle all water rights and claims on a particular water source. 7
The waiver of sovereign immunity under subparagraph
(a) (1) of the statute, does not extend to proceedings which
are exclusively administrative in nature. The reasoning of
8 is limited in that it only indicates that
Rank v. Krug"
the
McCarran Amendment extends to judicial proceedings as
general adjudications. Although dicta in the case supports
the argument that administrative proceedings do not fall
within the contemplated meaning of general adjudications
under the statute, the issue is more directly discussed in
34. Comment, Adjudication of Water Rights Claimed by the United StatesApplication of Common-Law Remedies and the McCarran Amendment of
1952, supra note 26, at 105.
35. Id. at 101.
36. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-4-1 to 24 (1953) (action brought by
state engineer); COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-302(1) (a) (1973) (action
brought by private parties). Both statutory procedures should be distinguished from the Wyoming system which provides for an administrative
proceeding. WYO. STAT. §§ 41-165 to -192 (1957).
37. Accord, Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.Cal. 1956). See generally,
CLARK, 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 106.2, at 95 (1907)
[hereinafter
cited as CLARK].
88. Supra, note 37.
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Hurley v. Abbott. 9 In Hurley the court found that the language of subparagraph (a) (1) contemplated judicial determination of all claims upon a particular water source.4" The
judicial treatment of the scope of the waiver granted to suits
for adjudication, if not conclusive on the issue of applicability
to administrative proceedings, raises serious doubt that such
proceedings fall within the parameters of the waiver.
2. Adjudication of Water Rights: Encompassing All Water
Claimants.
The McCarran Amendment was first interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Dugan v. Rank." In that case the Court
indicated that the statute contemplated adjudications which
were general in nature. In effect the Court held that all
parties claiming water rights on a stream system or other
water source must be present in the adjudication and that
all rights must be determined inter se.4
The requirement that the adjudication be comprehensive and general in nature is founded in the legislative history of the statute which indicates that the Amendment was
intended to apply exclusively to suits for the delineation of
water rights of all claimants. The legislative evolution of
the statute supports the conclusion drawn by the Ninth Circuit with regard to the nature of the comprehensive adjudication proceeding:
There can be little doubt as to the type of suit Congress had in mind. It was not a private dispute between certain water users as to their conflicting
rights to the use of water of a stream system;
rather, it was the quasi-public proceedings . . . in
which the rights of all claimants on a stream system,
as between themselves, are ascertained and officially stated."
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

259 F. Supp. 669 (D.Ariz. 1966).
Id. at 670.
372 U.S. 609 (1963).
Id. at 618.
See discussion regarding the legislative history of the statute, supra, note
28.
44. California v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 1961).
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The policy underlying the requirement of a general adjudication is the protection of the United States from joinder in a
proceeding which is directed only to the adjudication of
federal rights. When the McCarran Amendment was introduced, a number of senators feared that the statute might
be used by opponents of federal projects to delay proceedings
by suing the United States for the determination of isolated
claims upon a single water source. The history of the statute establishes that the McCarran Amendment was enacted
only to provide a mechanism whereby the states could coordinate federal claims with water rights arising under
state law. The statute does not provide a mechanism whereby federal claims may be the sole or even the primary focus
of the adjudication."
The hildirig of Dugan v. Rank, requiring the presence
of all claimants in an adjudication, was before the Supreme
Court in United States v. District Court, County of Eagle.4
The Court indicated that the holding of Dagan was not to be
applied in an overly technical manner. The federal government, vehemently resisting joinder in a Colorado adjudication, argued that the proceeding was not a general adjudication under the Dugan requirements since those claimants
whose rights had been decreed in prior adjudications were
not before the court. The Court, perceiving that the Dugan
holding, read literally, would unjustifiably limit the scope of
the McCarran Amendment, rejected the position of the government as "extremely technical." The Court agreed that
the absence of some claimants under prior decrees could present some problems if a conflict developed between their
rights and the federal rights involved, but held that this
factor was insufficient to obviate the necessity of federal
presence as a party to supplemental proceedings for adjudication."7
The Eagle County decision limits the availability of the
general adjudication requirement as a technical device by
which the United States may avoid joinder in state adjudi45. CLARK, ,upra note 37, § 106.2, at 95.
46. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
47. Id. at 525-26.
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cations. The decision does not abrogate the protective policy
of the Dugan requirement in that it is doubtful whether a
proceeding essentially private in nature would fall within
the scope of the McCarran Amendment. However, the Eagle
County holding clearly brings supplemental adjudication proceedings within the scope of the immunity waiver.
3. Adjudication of Water Rights: River Systems or Other
Sources.
The Eagle County decision also eliminated an ambiguity
regarding what constituted a river system for purposes of
the McCarran Amendment. In Eagle County the federal
government argued that an adjudication on a single tributary
did not fall within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme
Court, impatient with the government's attempts to avoid
joinder under the Amendment on highly technical grounds,
dismissed the argument as "almost frivolous.""
The extension of the applicability of the McCarran
Amendment to adjudications involving tributaries or portions of single rivers was consistent with the position taken
by previous courts.4" Essentially, the adjudication may, within the scope of the statute, involve a complete river system,
major tributaries or substantial portions of a river system.
Therefore, it would seem rare that this language of the statute would place an adjudication outside of the immunity
waiver.
4. Adjudication of Water Rights: The Nature of the Federal
Right.
The application of the McCarran Amendment is limited
to the rights to the use of water which the federal government acquired "by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise. . .

.

" Prior to Eagle

County some question had remained as to whether the stat48. Id. at 523-25.
49. See, e.g., Rank v. Krug, supra note 37.
50. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2) (1970).
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ute applied where the government claimed rights only under
the reservation doctrine.
The Eagle County decision resolved this issue. The Court
squarely held that the McCarran Amendment applies to any
adjudication of federal rights, including appropriated rights,
riparian rights and reserved rights." Any remaining question regarding the applicability of the statute to reserved
rights after Eagle County was evaporated in Colorado River
Water ConservationDistrict v. United States.2 Relying upon
the legislative history of the MeCarran Amendment, the
Court held that adjudications involving federally reserved
rights, in particular rights reserved on behalf of Indians,
were within the contemplated scope of the statute. Accordingly, it appears that the nature of the federal claim presents
no barrier to the determination and actual quantification of
federal rights under the McCarran Amendment. 4
Suits for the Administration of Water Rights
The McCarran Amendment gives consent to join the
United States not only in suits for the adjudication of rights
to the use of water, but also in "suits for the administration
of such rights. . . ."I' The extent of the waiver so provided
raises substantial and generally unresolved questions.
Although the express language of the statute does not
indicate clearly what is meant by suits for the administration of water rights, the legislative history does provide some
guidance. It is apparent from the history of the McCarran
Amendment that the bill was intended by its sponsor, Senator
McCarran, to include actions to settle disputes regarding
the interpretation of a decree rendered in a general adjudication and, further, to include actions affecting the rights
determined by such a decree whenever the rights of all the
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

United States v. Dist. Court, County of Eagle, supra note 46, at 1002.
Supra, note 2.
Id. at 1242-43.
See generally TRELEASE, supra note 7; CLARK, supra note 37, § 106.2.
43 U.S.C. § 66G(a) (2) (1970).
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users on the water source are involved.' It is quite likely
that actions in the nature of quiet title and declaratory
judgment would normally be within the accepted meaning
of a suit for the administration of water rights as indicated
by the legislative history of the McCarran Amendment."
The general determination and adjudication process in
a few western states is carried on exclusively by an administrative agency rather than by judicial action." Thus, a
serious question to be addressed is whether the statute waives
sovereign immunity for administrative proceedings as opposed to judicial actions. If the McCarran Amendment does
not waive immunity before administrative proceedings the
anomalous result is reached that Congress has lifted the bar
of sovereign immunity in some states but not in others.
Although administrative proceedings for the regulation
of water rights serve a purpose identical to the analogous
judicial proceedings, it is quite probable that the McCarran
Amendment does not waive immunity for proceedings similar to the Wyoming administrative determination. It has
generally been held that proceedings before administrative
bodies are not suits within the generally accepted meaning
of the term. 9 One commentator has even raised doubt as to
the applicability of the statute to the California proceeding
in which use is made of both administrative and judicial
proceedings."
56. See Hearings on S.18 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,82d Cong., 1st Sess. 46-48 (1951); S. REP. No. 755, supra. note 28,
at 9-10.
7. Although such suits are not judicial general adjudications under most state
water codes, the statute would appear to encompass them. See generally
Comment, Adjudication of Water Rights Claimed by the United StatesApplication of Conmon-Law Remedies and the McCarran Amendment of
1952, supra note 26.
58. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-165 to 192 (1957).
59. Rank v. Krug, supra note 37, at 71-72. Cf. United States v. Hennen, 300
F. Supp. 256, 263-64 (D.Nev. 1968), holding that subsection (a) (2) of the
McCarran Amendment waives immunity in a suit to administer a decree
rendered in a general adjudication. The court found that a suit for an
administration is an action brought to execute the decree, to enforce its
provisions to resolve conflicts at to the meaning of the decree, and to construe or interpret its language. Id.
60. CLARK, supra note 37, § 106.2, at 95.
The California procedure combines judicial and administrative proceedings so that no final determination may be made without a court decree. See CAL. WATFR CODE §§ 2000-2900 (West 1971).
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Although it is not likely that the McCarran Amendment
waives immunity for administrative determinations, three
areas of argument would appear to support such a waiver.
Initially, the background of the statute, although certainly
not definitive on the issue, would lend logical support to the
application of the McCarran Amendment to administrative
proceedings. In Nevada, where the sponsor of the legislation
was a leading water lawyer, as in other western states, there
is no avenue open to the courts except by initial participation in prior administrative proceedings. 1 In states utilizing the California system of combining administrative and
judicial proceedings or in states adhering to the exclusive
system of administrative determination, with appeals in the
court, it would not seem unreasonable to argue that the historical background of and rationale for the McCarran Amendment contemplated waiver of sovereign immunity in these
proceedings.
The distinction between judicial and administrative proceedings may often be viewed as an exercise founded on
semantics rather than on practice. The procedure utilized
pursuant to the Colorado Water Rights Determination and
Administration Act of 196962 has been consistently held to
comport with the requirements of the McCarran Amendment.63 Although the Colorado procedure nominally establishes a system of judicial adjudication, the proceedings essentially parallel the proceedings conducted by a state administrator. 4 The differences between the Colorado system
and a proceeding before a state administrator with rights of
judicial appeal could be argued to provide a distinction without substance.
61. TRELEASIE upra note 7, at 206-07.
62. CoLo. REV. SrAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to 602 (1973).
63. See Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, supra note 2; United
States v. Dist. Court, County of Eagle, supra note 46; United States v.
Dist. Court, Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
64. See generally Kiechel v. Burke, supra note 3.
The Colorado system relies heavily upon the work of a water clerk in
each water division. The proceedings are facially judicial in nature. However, it is clear that the Adjudication proceeding utilizes the clerk in a
functionally administrative capacity. See CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92101 to 602 (1973).
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A more substantial argument for waiver in administrative proceedings may be found in the Supreme Court's perspective with regard to recent challenges to the scope of the
Amendment. In a series of recent decisions the Court seems
to have adopted the perspective that not only does the McCarran Amendment permit joinder in state proceedings, but
state proceedings are normally the best place to determine
federal water rights. 5 Even though Eagle County and Colorado River Water Conservation District arose in Colorado
under a nominally judicial determination process, the lack
of sympathy which the Court has evinced for "frivolous"
and "technical" objections to the scope of the legislation may
be dispositive of the issue here. It is not improbable that the
Court would be willing to construe the McCarran Amendment so as to include administrative proceedings subject to
appeal to the courts or administrative proceedings which are
anterior to final judicial determinations. In effect, this position would support application of the McCarran Amendment
to any proceeding, judicial or administrative in nature, which
is not private in nature, but a public action reaching all
claims on a water source.6
Conclusions: Possible Reforms
Despite the availability of arguments founded on the
historical background of the McCarran Amendment and an
apparently liberal construction of the scope of the statute
by the Supreme Court, the prevailing view among most commentators is that the McCarran Amendment does not waive
immunity for state administrative determination of the
relative rights to the use of water on a stream."7 Even if
the statute were held to apply to administrative determination, however, a subtantial problem remains as in a number
of states the relative rights to appropriation have already
been adjudicated or determined, at least on some streams.
65. Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, supra note 2, at 1246-48.
66. This reading of the McCarran Amendment is advocated by a leading authority in the area of federal-state relations in the area of water rights.
See TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 207.
67. See, CLARK, supra note 37, § 106.2, at 95; Comment, Adjudiaction of Water
Rights Claimed by the United States-Application of Common-Law Remedies and the McCarran Amendment of 1952, supra note 26, at 117.
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Hence, there are no general adjudication proceedings into
which the United States may be called." The result, for all
practical purposes is that the McCarran Amendment waives
immunity in some states or parts of states, but not in all
with respect to the determination of such interrelated water
rights.
Commentators, recognizing the ambiguities regarding
the scope of the McCarran Amendment, have called for reform and clarifying legislation on both the federal and state
levels. The most simplistic and direct approach to clarifying
the scope of the McCarran Amendment would, of course,
involve congressional action amending the language of the
statute. Given the underlying purpose behind the legislation,
to insure participation of the United States in state water
determination so as to effect a full and complete delineation
of claims on limited water resources, the federal reform
should clearly and unambiguously indicate that the McCarran Amendment waives immunity in any public proceeding
which reaches all claims on a particular water source. 69
However the extension of the McCarran Amendment's waiver to administrative determination appears to be ill-fated.
Since 1955 the Congress has considered a multitude of bills
purporting to clarify federal and state relationships with
regard to western waters. Each attempt has been soundly
rejected."0 Congress has indicated that the problems surrounding the applicability of the McCarran Amendment to
certain state adjudication proceedings will not be resolved
by subjecting the federal government, procedurally and substantively, to state water law.71
68. TREixAS, supra note 7, at 207. Professor Trelease indicates that:
Every stream in Wyoming is now adjudicated and although the
United States may apply for a permit and then request its separate
adjudication, there are no proceedings into which the United
States may be called. In some states, New Mexico is an example,
the same condition will obtain on streams that have been adjudicated, but the United States may be called in to establish its rights
on other rivers which have so far been neglected.
69. Congressional clarification of the language of the McCarran Amendment
is advocated by a number of commentators. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 37,
§ 106.2, at 95.
70.

See generally Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over Western WatersA Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RuTGERs L. REV. 423

(1966).
71. Id. at 428.
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An alternative federal approach is advocated by the
Public Land Law Review Commission. This approach would
entail limiting the extent of the reserved rights doctrine.72
However, the reserved rights doctrine has been staunchly
defended on the federal level as a mechanism allowing federal water use on a very flexible level, unimpeded by state
control. The doctrine is financially defended on the basis that
it lessens the cost of federal water related projects in that
the federal government need not purchase water held by postreservation appropriators."2 Thus, a substantial resistance
to any material limitation of the doctrine in accordance with
the recommendation of the Public Land Law Review Commission must be expected.
It is, therefore, left to the states to provide a mechanism
whereby water claims may be adjudicated and determined
within the parameters of the McCarran Amendment. In developing such a procedure, a number of guidelines regarding the scope of the statute's applicability are available.
It is clear that the Colorado statutory adjudication process provides an acceptable general adjudication for purposes of the McCarran Amendment. The Eagle County and
Colorado River Water Conservation District decisions definitely establish that the supplemental proceedings are adjudications into which the United States may be brought for a
determination of federal reserved rights along with other
claims before the court.
74

The state attempting to reform its own adjudication
proceeding so as to clearly fall within the parameters of the
McCarran Amendment should be primarily concerned with
two factors. Initially, to qualify as an adjudication under
subsection (a) (1) of the statute, it would seem that the
proceedings must be judicial in nature and general, as opposed to an essentially private action. Whether a proceeding
combining the use of administrative and judicial determinations would fall within the definition of a "suit" within the
72. ONE THriR OF THE NATION'S LAND, aupra note 3, at 146-49.
73.

Id. at 144.

74. See text accompanying note 63, supra.
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statute is unclear. However, it is implied in the legislative
history of the McCarran Amendment that the statute's waiver of immunity extends to this type of proceeding.75 Secondly,
to qualify as a suit to administer a decree of water adjudication, the proceeding should be framed as an action essentially designed to settle disputes regarding the interpretation
of a decree rendered in a general adjudication, or an action
affecting the rights determined by such a decree, involving
the rights of all users on a water source." General actions
brought by a state official or a private user in the nature of
declaratory judgments or actions to quiet title would be
typical of an acceptable administrative suit under the McCarran Amendment.
As a state reforming its adjudication proceeding so as
to comport with the McCarran Amendment moves further
from either the Colorado adjudication proceeding or the
guidelines delineated in the proceeding paragraph, the likelihood of judicial acceptance for McCarran Amendment purposes diminishes. In effect, the state should provide for a
proceeding affecting all claimants on a water source with
heavy judicial overtures or a judicial proceeding of a general
nature brought to enforce or settle disputes arising out of
a general adjudication decree.
THE WYOMING GENERAL ADJUDICATION STATUTE

Doubting the applicability of the McCarran Amendment
to the Wyoming administrative system for water right determinations, the Wyoming Legislature enacted a bill which
allows a general adjudication of the water rights of all claimants on any river system or other water source." The statute authorizes the determination of the nature, extent and
priority of the rights of each claimant on a particular
78
source.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See text accompanying notes 60-64, supra.
United States v. Hennen, supra note 59, at 261.
Enrolled Act No. 2, 44th State Legislature (1977).
Enrolled Act No. 2(1) (a), 44th State Legislature (1977).
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The nature of the action authorized in the statute is
that of a declaratory judgment action brought by the state
attorney general for the general delineation of claims on a
water source. The statute provides that the general adjudication shall entail the determination of the extent and priority
of water rights on a particular water source through a judicial proceeding. The legislatively prescribed general adjudication is not, however, exclusively judicial in character. The
statute authorizes the court conducting the general adjudication to certify to the State Board of Control any legal or
factual issues which the court finds appropriate for administrative determination."
The court conducting the general adjudication is vested
with four duties. Initially, the court is to confirm all relevant rights evidenced by antecedent court decrees, certificates of appropriation or certificates of construction issued
by the State Board of Control. The court is also directed to
determine the status of ongoing permits to acquire water
rights and adjudicate such rights to the extent possible. A
determination is also to be made with regard to the extent
and priority of any other interest in the water source before
the court. Finally, the court of the general adjudication is
directed to establish a tabulation of all relevant water rights
and their respective dates of priority."
The scope of the statute is broadly defined. The availability of statutory general adjudication is not limited by
the nature of the water source, the type of claim to water
involved, or by the nature of the defendants who are or may
be claimants to the water. 1 Realizing that the nature of a
general adjudication so broad in scope may present burdensome problems to the state attorney general bringing an
action under the statute, the legislature provided that personal service is not required where the number of potential
79. Enrolled Act No. 2(1) (a) (i) (A) (1), 44th State Legislature (1977).
80. Enrolled Act No. 2 (1) (a) (i) (A) (2)-(6), 44th State Legislature (1977).
81. The statute provides for a sweeping general adjudication "of the water
rights of all persons in any river system and all other sources. . . ." Enrolled Act No. 2(1) (a), 44th State Legislature (1977). See also section
(1) (a) (i) (B) of the act which defines the parties to whom the adjudication may apply.
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defendants exceeds one thousand. Where the number of
potential defendants exceeds this number, service by certified mail on known claimants and by publication for all other
potential parties in interests is authorized.82
The purpose underlying the general adjudication statute is to allow the State of Wyoming to take advantage of
the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the McCarran
Amendment, thus permitting an action for the purpose of
quantifying federal reserved rights in state court rather
than in federal court."8 Although the statute facially indicates that a general adjudication action shall establish the
extent and priority of all claims on a particular water source,
the operation of the statute indicates that a much more
limited purpose underlies the action. The court conducting
a general adjudication under the statute has the authority
only to confirm pre-existing rights.8" The statute leaves
no room for the court to declare abandonments or forfeitures or to otherwise alter the extent and priority of
pre-existing water rights. Hence, the focus of the adjudication is primarily directed to presently unadjudicated rights,
including federal claims under the reserved rights doctrine. 5
The scope of the adjudication is further limited by the fact
The
that every stream in Wyoming is now adjudicated.
primary outstanding and unadjudicated rights to water are
federal claims. It is to these potentially vast and unquantified rights that the statute authorizing general water adjudications is directed.
Enrolled Act No. 2(1) (a) (ii), 44th State Legislature (1977).
See text accompanying note 9, supra.
Enrolled Act. No. 2(1) (a) (i) (A) (2), 44th State Legislature (1977).
Commenting on the focus of the new statute, the Wyoming Attorney General indicated that the proceeding allows the State to adjudicate the relative
priority of water rights and to quantify any unadjudicated claims to water.
The primary unadjudicated water claims are those of the federal government. Casper Star-Tribune, January 25, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
The State of Wyoming has filed suit for the general adjudication of all
rights to the use of water in the Big Horn River system and all other
sources of water in Water Division No. 3. In re the General Adjudication
of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All other
Sources, State of Wyoming, No. 4993 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 6th Dist., filed Jan.
24, 1977). The principal claim to be adjudicated is that of the federal government. Casper Star-Tribune, January 25, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
86. See text accompanying note 68, supra.
82.
83.
84.
85.
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The general adjudication procedure authorized would
appear to conform to the requirements within the McCarran
Amendment so as to allow joinder of the United States for
the purpose of determining the extent and priority of federal
water claims in Wyoming within the general adjudication.
However, certain questions remain. These questions involve
due process concerns and a number of areas in which the
statute might fail to comport with the requirements of the
sovereign immunity waiver in the McCarran Amendment.
Due Process: Notice Procedure under The General Adjudication Statute
The primary hurdle which the statute must overcome is
the threshold issue of whether the general adjudication proceeding comports with due process requirements of notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Of concern is the acceptability of notice by mail and notice by publication as provided
in the statute when the number of potential defendants exceeds one thousand.
Non-personal notice is disfavored by the courts. The
courts manifest a strong preference for personal service and
notice in any proceeding where such notice is practical. 7
The service and notice provisions of the Wyoming statute are very similar to the provisions established under the
Colorado Water Rights Determination and Administration
Act of 1969.8 The Colorado Act essentially established seven
water divisions within the state and provided for a continuing judicial adjudication of water rights within each division.
The procedure involves the filing of a water right application
with the water clerk for each water division. Notice of pending water claims is effected through mailing and publication.8"
87. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
88. Compare Enrolled Act No. 2(1) (a) (ii), 44th State Legislature (1977) with
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-302(3) (1973).
89. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-302(3) (1973). See generally Kiechel and
Burke, supra note 3.
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The Colorado adjudication procedure has been before
the courts in a series of decisions dating to the Eagle County"0
and Water District No. 51 cases. The impact of these decisions is that the Colorado statutory scheme for adjudication
of water rights has been upheld as comporting with due
process and McCarran Amendment requirements in all
respects. 2
The Wyoming statutory general adjudication scheme
differs from the Colorado proceedings in that the Wyoming
adjudication is not continuous in nature. 3 However,
the judicial acceptance of the Colorado procedure for
notice should be determinative of the issue in Wyoming as the
lack of a continuous type of adjudication is immaterial to the
due process notice considerations. The statutory schemes of
both states embody the position that personal service would
be prohibitive in an action nominally involving thousands of
potential defendants. The provisions of service by mailing
and publication are acceptable for purposes of due process
in Colorado, and the Wyoming scheme does not materially
alter the process.
The McCarranAmendment Requirement of a Judicial
Proceeding
The initial requirement for compliance with the waiver
of sovereign immunity in the McCarran Amendment is that
the proceeding for adjudication or administration of water
rights must be judicial in nature. 4 The utilization of an adjudication proceeding employing both judicial and administrative determinations raises some question as to the applicability of the McCarran Amendment to the Wyoming general adjudication procedure.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Supra, note 46.
Supra, note 63.
See text accompanying note 63, supra.
The Wyoming Statute is not designed to allow a continuous adjudication of
all claims on a water source. The statute expressly restricts the adjudication to a process of confirming all previously adjudicated and decreed rights
and quantifying and determining the priority of any unadjudicated, claims.
Enrolled Act No. 2(1) (a) (i) (2) and (4), 44th State Legislature (1977).
Compare the Wyoming Statute in this respect with CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 37-92-301 through 307, and 402 (1973).
94. See text accompanying notes 37 through 40, supra.
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The Wyoming general adjudication procedure does not
vest the conduct of the proceeding exclusively in the court
or an administrative agency.95 As was previously mentioned
some question has been raised with regard to the applicability
of the McCarran Amendment to procedures which combine
judicial and administrative proceedings. The answer given
in the context of the California proceeding, which combines
judicial and administrative proceedings in such a way that
no final determination is made without a court decree,"6 is
that the McCarran Amendment implicitly waives immunity
in the combined proceeding.
The emphasis in the McCarran Amendment's waiver of
sovereign immunity is that the proceeding must be consummated by a final decree rendered by a court. The California
statutory scheme expressly utilizes supplementary administrative proceedings, but the final decree is rendered by a
court. In Colorado the use of administrative determinations
is an implicit but nevertheless integral part of the adjudication proceedings. Both the California and Colorado adjudication schemes have been held to comport with the requirements of the McCarran Amendment, largely because a final
judicial decree is necessary to effectuate a final determination.
The Wyoming general adjudication scheme utilizes certification of legal and factual issues to an administrative
body, but preserves a final determination of water rights on
a particular source to a court decree. Thus, the utilization
of an administrative agency within the Wyoming procedure
would probably not prevent the joinder of the United States
in a general adjudication under the McCarran Amendment,
as the administrative proceeding is largely supplemental and
the final determination must be rendered by a judicial decree.
95. See text accompanying note 79, supra.
96. See text accompanying note 60, supra.
97. CLARK, 8upra note 37, § 106.2, at 95.
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The McCarran Amendment Requirement of a General
Adjudication
The most troublesome question posed by the Wyoming
general adjudication statute is whether it provides for a suit
for adjudication of a general nature within the meaning of
the McCarran Amendment. Dugan v. Rank"8 established the
requirement that the McCarran Amendment consents to the
joinder of the United States only in general adjudication
proceedings wherein all parties claiming water rights on a
stream system must be before the court for the purpose of
determining all claims to water on the stream."
The Wyoming general adjudication statute essentially
provides such an action. However, the adjudication does not
provide for the determination of all claims on the water
which is the subject of the proceeding. The priority and extent of all previously adjudicated rights on the water source
may only be confirmed in the general adjudication.' 0
Essentially, a proceeding under the statute may be one
directed primarily against the United States for the purpose
of quantifying federal claims to Wyoming waters. Serious
question has been raised with regard to whether the McCarran Amendment is sufficiently broad in scope to allow
suits directed primarily or solely against the United States.'
Such an action would violate the purpose of the McCarran
Amendment, to assure the presence of the United States as
a party in a proceeding to determine the extent and respective
priorities of all claimants on a river system.
The Wyoming general adjudication statute does appear
to fulfill the requirement of providing for an action nonprivate in nature and not directed primarily against the
United States under the reasoning of Eagle County.' There
the federal government argued that the Colorado adjudication proceeding was not general in nature since those whose
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Supra, note 41.
Id. at 617-19.
See text accompanying notes 79 and 95, supra.
CLARK, supra note 37, § 106.2, at 95.
Supra, note 46.
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rights had been decreed in prior adjudications were not
before the court. Essentially, the position of the government
was that the proceedings were supplemental in nature and
therefore failed to comport with the general adjudication
The Court
requirement of the McCarran Amendment.'
rejected the "extremely technical" position with regard to
the scope of the McCarran Amendment, holding that the
supplemental adjudications were within the scope of the
sovreign immunity waiver." 4 Later cases dealing with the
Colorado proceedings have continued the liberal interpretation of the applicability of the McCarran Amendment, culminating in the reasoning of Colorado River Water Conservation District' that considerations of judicial efficiency
make state adjudication proceedings before state courts the
best place for a determination of federal water claims under
the reservation doctrine.' 6
The adjudication does reach all claimants to the water
source in that all are joined in the proceeding, will be bound
by its outcome, and issues bearing on their rights may be
determined. The proceeding is not simply a suit by the State
to determine the validity of unadjudicated claims to Wyoming
water. Rather, the purpose of the suit is to incorporate the
unadjudicated claims into the system of priorities which
exists for adjudicated claims. Thus, the determination made
by the suit can have serious consequences for those having
adjudicated rights, and they can be expected to participate
actively if they feel it is in their interest to do so. Furthermore, the suit seeks to do nothing more than is done in Colorado and other states-that is, to add the valid unadjudicated
claims to the list of adjudicated claims. As such, the suit
appears to be general in nature, and the fact that it does
not allow the litigation of every possible issue concerning
rights to the water source appears to be unimportant.
The issue of whether the Wyoming statute provides a
general adjudication for purposes of the McCarran Amend103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 525.
Id. at 525-26.
Supra note 2.
Id. at 1246-48. See text accompanying note 65, supra.
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ment could be a troublesome one. The state authorities recognize the likelihood of federal resistance to joinder under
the statute. However, one lower state court has ruled that
the Wyoming proceeding is one in which the United States
may be joined under the McCarran Amendment.1 1 7 In addition, the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming rejected federal attempts to remove to that court a
suit brought by the State pursuant to the statute. In his
Conclusions of Law, Judge Kerr stated that "the character
and adequacy of the Wyoming water right adjudication system and the clear policy evinced by the McCarran Amendment"1 8 called for the denial of the motion to remove.
The Wyoming General Adjudication Statute: Conclusion
The Wyoming legislature attempted to provide a mechanism whereby federal claims to water in the state based on
the reserved rights doctrine might be quantified and coordinated with rights derived through state law. Such a mechanism would necessarily need the waiver of sovereign immunity
provided by the McCarran Amendment which contemplates
a general adjudication proceeding brought by the attorney
general before a state court.
The Wyoming general adjudication statute leaves open
the avenue for federal challenge as to its compliance with
the McCarran Amendment. Although issues of due process
and whether the statute provides for a judicial proceeding
within the meaning of the McCarran Amendment raise some
question as to the ultimate efficacy of the statute, the primary issue confronting the statute is whether the adjudication provided by the statute is truly a general, non-private
107. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big
Horn River System and All other Sources, State of Wyoming, supra note
85. On January 24, 1977, the District Court for the Fifth Judicial District
entered an order providing:
1. This action is a general adjudication of all water rights on the
Big Horn River System and all other sources in Water Division
Number three, State of Wyoming, and 2. that the United States
of America by its enactment of 43 U.S.C. § 666 has waived its sovereign immunity and has consented to be joined in this action ....
Id.
108. Wyoming v. United States of America and all persons in the Big Horn
River System and other sources in Water Division Number Three, State
of Wyoming, No. C77-039K (D.Wyo. May 31, 177).
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proceeding. The legislative history of the statute indicates
that its primary purpose is to provide for the determination
of the extent and priority of federal reserved water rights.
However, given judicial acceptance of the Colorado system,
which is not essentially different from the Wyoming system, and given that the new Wyoming proceeding is harmonious with the underlying policies of the McCarran
Amendment, it would appear the new Wyoming proceeding
could withstand challenge as to its general nature. Also, if
federal resistance proves successful, it could well prevent
delineation of federal reserved rights and coordination with
State-created water rights in the near future. If the unknown extent of federal reserved rights and their impact on
Wyoming development cannot be resolved, the financial uncertainty currently impairing state planning and development will continue unabated.
W. MICHAEL KLEPPINGER
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